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Abstract  
 
It is becoming a common concern amongst the judiciary, practising lawyers, 
academics, and those who draft legislation,  that an acceptable standard of drafting is 
not always being achieved in primary legislation and, still less so, in secondary 
legislation. This paper discusses whether legislative bodies are, or should become, 
legally responsible for substandard legislation, especially where this negligence 
affects individuals disproportionately.  It also considers some of the legal and 
practical problems that may arise in the case of negligently-drafted primary legislation 
and contrasts this with the less defensible position of subordinate legislation.  The 
problem of immunity from legal action in respect of negligent legislative acts is 
discussed and it is postulated that European Community law may provide a model for 
developing a new tort of legislative negligence.   
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The Common Law  
 
One of the reasons why so many people died when the RMS Titanic sank in 1912 was 
because the Board of Trade rules relating to the number (and capacity) of lifeboats 
that had to be carried on such a ship had not been changed since 1894.  Those rules 
were based upon the tonnage of ships rather than on the number of passengers and 
crew carried in them.5  Although the Titanic had carried more lifeboats, floats, and 
rafts than the Board of Trade rules then required (sufficient to save 1,178 lives instead 
of the ‘statutory’ number of 962) even this capacity would have saved no more than 
52% of the 2,207 people on board.6   In fact only 651 people were lowered into the 
boats.7 
 
This paper is not about the Titanic disaster, nor is that notorious example of 
'legislative negligence' the only inspiration for the ideas which this paper now wishes 
to address. But the loss of life in that disaster and the disaster itself are being used to 
illustrate three points: 
 
 1.  Legislative negligence is not limited to instances where pure economic loss is 
caused to individuals.  Such negligence can also cause loss of life and personal 
injuries.8 Thus, even if we accept the Murphy9 principle - that the tort of 
negligence should not normally extend to instances of pure economic loss - the 
consequences of legislative negligence can be more serious than this.10 
 
                                                 
5 The 1894 Rules for Life-Saving Appliances, made under s.427, Merchant Shipping Act 1894, did no 
more than treat the Titanic as a vessel of 'over 10,000 tons', even though it was a vessel of the 
unprecedented tonnage of 46,328 tons. 
6  W. Lord, A Night to Remember (London: Penguin ed., 1978) p127.   
7  Ibid, p197. 
8  For another example of legislation which might endanger health and safety see the Building 
Regulations relating to thermal insulation and their failure to take account of indoor exposure to radon 
gas.   This exposure is estimated to cause 2,500 lung cancer deaths per year in the U.K.  It is difficult to 
see how any promoter of new thermal insulation regulations could rely on the ‘state of the art’ defence 
when the risks of such deaths have already been widely publicised even to students.  See: ‘Dealing with 
radon gas’ [by P. Adams], ‘Mainly for Students’ series,  Estates Gazette, 9 December 1989.  
9 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] AC 398, a case which might not be followed in all 
Commonwealth jurisdictions and which might, in any event, have been decided per incuriam for 
failing to consider the Latent Damage Act 1986.  
10 For a criticism of the new building regulations see: ‘A cost of global warming they’d rather keep 
hidden’, J. Howell, Sunday Telegraph, 14 November 2004.   
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2.  Legislative negligence is not confined to primary legislation enacted by a 
sovereign legislature. Secondary legislation (and quasi-legislation) drafted by 
someone in a government department,  local authority, or statutory body is just as 
likely to be affected.  Secondary legislation enacted under delegated powers 
receives no Parliamentary scrutiny. As the law lords have impliedly recognised, it 
would be an over-generous interpretation of the Bill of Rights 1688 to give to 
modern delegated legislation the same immunity from judicial scrutiny which is 
given, by that statute, to 'freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in 
Parliament'.11 
 
3. Legislative negligence includes failing to revoke or to amend out of date 
legislation, no less than it includes enacting defective legislation in the first place -   
assuming, of course, that a government minister had been obligated by Parliament 
to keep that legislation under review. 
 
What is Legislative Negligence? 
 
The concept of negligence imports a high threshold to making any claim. The 
definition encompasses instances in a European context where a Member State has 
failed to implement legislation or to fulfil its Community or international obligations.   
In the case of legislative institutions, problems arise over the ‘legislative soup’ created 
by the activities of those institutions.  These activities are not confined to what occurs 
within a single institution. Legislative activity involves a complex web of interacting 
individuals acting within the constraints of a number of institutional settings.  Each of 
these institutions functions in accordance with its own priorities and ways of doing 
business.  They are all subject to the personal agendas of human actors and the 
capacity of these individuals to rationalise and obscure (what has been termed)  their 
‘vocabularies of motive’.12  Despite such pluralism there remains an overriding 
concern for efficiency and fairness in the way legislation is produced.  Where harm is 
found to be directly attributable to legislative action (and inaction in cases where this 
                                                 
11  See, for example:  Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisement) Regulations 1984, 
which led the law lords to take judicial notice of the fact that secondary legislation does not receive 
sufficient scrutiny and led them to rewrite those regulations in Porter v Honey [1988] 1 WLR 1420. 
12  H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953). 
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cannot be justified), it is necessary to find new ways of ensuring that individuals have 
proper and sufficient means of redress. 
 
Legislative negligence is not the same thing as the enactment of an unpopular or 
unwise law; still less is it the enactment of a law without foreseeing the unintended 
consequences of the policy behind it.  It is not directly concerned with ineffective 
legislation13 or, more generally, with the failure of legislative measures or the process 
of reform.14  Clearly, a policy may be unpopular, aberrant, quirky, old-fashioned, 
short-sighted, or even unreasonable (in the ordinary sense of that word) without it 
being unlawful.15 
 
Legislative negligence, in the context of this paper, means such an obvious  
inattention to the consequences of the wording of legislation that, if such 
workmanship had been perpetrated by a lawyer drafting a lease, will, trust deed, or 
any other legal document, it would have amounted to professional negligence. This 
limitation should be enough to answer any allegation that such a cause of action 
would enable floods of discontented voters to claim damages at common law from 
their lawgivers.16   Placing the threshold for a cause of action as high as this begs the 
question of whether other forms of redress are needed to compensate for 
incompetence in drafting legislation where an individual suffers financial or other 
harm directly as a result of the wrongful act or omission. 
 
Legislative negligence is not a cause of action entitling anyone to question the 
policies which (for good or ill) have inspired primary or secondary legislation.  There 
may be other procedures for doing that.17   Legislative negligence is a cause of action 
                                                 
13 For example, the contaminated land regime established by the Environment Act 1995 and by Part 
IIA Environmental Protection Act 1990 is thought by many to be unworkable and was thought it would 
be so before it came into effect in April 2000.  For a recent evaluation of this regime, see: ‘Tension 
mounts as land remediation regime stalls’, ENDS Report 375, April 2006,  pp 35-39. 
14  See J.E. Pointing and M. Bulos, ‘Some implications of failed issues of reform: the case of leasehold 
enfranchisement’, 8 International Journal of Urban & Regional Research (1984) 467-480. 
15   Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
16   There appears to have been only one successful claim against a solicitor for the negligent drafting 
of such a document reported in  the Estates Gazette Law Reports,1975-2006: Theodore Goddard v 
Fletcher King Services Ltd [1997] 2 EGLR 131. (Surveyors had to make a 20% contribution to the 
damages paid by solicitors for their failure to include an 'upwards only' rent review clause in a lease). 
17  For example, by alleging that the legislation is ultra vires. 
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arising out of the damage which has been caused by the failure of a government 
department or legislative draftsman to attend to the obvious adverse consequences18 
of the legislation which the department is promoting.  It is as if a solicitor was asked 
by a landlord to draft a business lease but drafted a rent review clause which (for 21 
years or more) had had the effect of producing less than the market rent19, or as if 
such a solicitor omitted the user covenant or some of the other covenants intended to 
be binding on the tenant.  
 
Negligence in Primary Legislation 
 
It would be highly unusual to find examples of legislation that had deliberately been 
drafted incompetently.  More common are examples of inadvertence, omission, or a 
failure to consider adequately the relationship between a piece of new legislation and 
earlier legislation.  Those responsible for drafting legislation are constrained by time 
and by the complexity of statutes. There are many examples of judges criticising the 
wording of primary legislation, even in cases where the legislation in question was 
subject to conscientious scrutiny in Parliament.20  Even those statutes which have 
been based on reports of the Law Commission (or the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee) are not immune from seemingly obvious errors.21  Not least important is 
the complexity of modern legislation and time available for drafting it.  As the First 
Scottish Parliamentary Counsel has recently put it: 
 
(W)hile the length and complexity of a statute is a consequence mainly of its 
                                                 
18 R. Jackson and J. Powell, Professional Negligence (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed., 2007) refers 
to one case where a negligently typed codicil to a will would have had the effect, if the Chancery 
Division had not intervened, of revoking the whole of clause 7 of the original will,  instead of revoking 
only 'clause 7(iv)' as the testator had  intended:  Re Morris [1971] in  Jackson and Powell,  para. 11-
226, n 66.    
19  Theodore Goddard v Fletcher King Services Ltd  [1997] 2 EGLR 131.  See also: County Personnel 
(Employment Agency) Ltd v Alan R. Pulver & Co [1986] 2 EGLR 246, a case where a solicitor was 
held to be negligent for failing to advise a tenant of the effect of an unusual rent review clause in a 
sublease.  
20 The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 led to contradictory decisions of the House of Lords within a year 
of each other (19 May 1985-15 May 1986). Yet, when it was a Bill of Parliament, it had been 
scrutinised not only by a standing committee but also by a select committee which had heard expert 
witnesses.   The contradictory decisions, relating to the question of conceptually ‘impossible’ attempts, 
were:  Anderton v Ryan [1985] AC 560 and R v Shivpuri [1987] AC 1. 
21 The Theft Act 1968 and the Criminal Damage Act 1971 are obvious examples, even though those 
statutes were intended to reform serious criminal offences- an area of the law where ambiguities are 
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subject matter, it is also a consequence of the amount of time available for its 
preparation and the number of civil service specialists available to contribute 
to what it says.22 
 
There are times when the problems go rather deeper.  The analysis of Rose LJ in 
Bradley points to a wider malaise.  In respect of the ‘bad character’ provisions in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, he opines23: 
 
It is in the public interest that the criminal law and its procedures, so far as 
possible, be clear and straightforward so that all those directly affected, in 
particular, defendants, victims, the police, the probation service, jurors, 
lawyers for defence or prosecution, judges and magistrates, professional and 
lay, should be readily able to understand it. Sadly the provisions of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, which we have had to consider on this appeal, are, 
as is apparent, conspicuously unclear in circumstances where clarity could 
easily have been achieved. It is not this Court's function to identify whether 
the government, Parliament or Parliamentary draftsmen are responsible for 
this perplexing legislation. It is this Court's duty loyally to glean from the 
statutory language, if it can, Parliament's intention and this we have sought to 
do in the face of obfuscatory language. The public is entitled to know of the 
difficulties which such legislation creates for all concerned. The point is 
graphically highlighted in the present case, because the Crown have advanced 
to this Court a construction of the statute which is completely contrary to that 
suggested by the Home Office press release on the day the provisions came 
into force. 
It is more than a decade since the late Lord Taylor of Gosforth C.J. called for a 
reduction in the torrent of legislation affecting criminal justice. Regrettably, 
that call has gone unheeded by successive governments. Indeed, the quantity 
of such legislation has increased and its quality has, if anything, diminished. 
The 2003 Act has 339 sections and 38 schedules and runs to 453 pages. It is, 
                                                                                                                                            
impermissible. 
22 J. McCluskie, ‘New Approaches to UK Legislative Drafting: The View from Scotland’ (2004) 25 
Statute Law Review 137. 
23  R v Bradley [2005] EWCA, Crim 20, paras 38,39. 
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in pre-metric terms, an inch thick. The provisions which we have considered 
have been brought into force prematurely, before appropriate training could be 
given by the Judicial Studies Board or otherwise to approximately 2,000 
Crown Court and Supreme Court judges and 30,000 magistrates. In the 
meantime, the judiciary and, no doubt, the many criminal justice agencies for 
which this Court cannot speak, must, in the phrase familiar during the Second 
World War "make do and mend". That is what we have been obliged to do in 
the present appeal and it has been an unsatisfactory activity, wasteful of scarce 
resources in public money and judicial time. 
 
The Need for Precision in Property Law 
 
Examples of legislative negligence can be found in almost every area of the law,    
even in those areas where certainty is supposed to be the pearl of great price. For 
example, in landlord and tenant law, where property rights depend upon the lack of 
ambiguities in statutes, the draftsman of the Rent Act 1977 evidently failed to recall 
that a landlord’s interest may be jointly owned by two or more people.  Section 12 of 
the Rent Act 1977 was intended to benefit resident landlords and to prevent their 
tenants from obtaining full statutory protection. However, this section was worded in 
such a way that it was not made clear what the position of the tenant would be if the 
landlord’s interest was jointly owned by two or more people, one of whom lived in 
the property and the other (or others) lived elsewhere. This led to at least two 
conflicting county court decisions.24  
 
A subsequent case involving joint landlords, heard in the Court of Appeal, decided the 
issue in favour of the landlords.25 The unsuccessful resident landlord in the earlier 
county court case, which had been decided in favour of the tenant, had, by that time, 
already paid his tenant in order to obtain vacant possession of the demised premises.26  
He afterwards sought advice about whether he could sue the appropriate government 
                                                 
24 Szachno, Krasinskam and Skwarcynski v Gough (unreported) (Kingston-upon-Thames County 
Court, 15 December 1977) where it was held that the tenant was not a protected tenant, discussed in the 
Conveyancer’s Notebook [1978] Conveyancer 6, and Baran and Bednar v Magas (unreported). 
(Clerkenwell County Court, 21 October 1982) where it was held that the tenant was a protected tenant.    
25 Cooper v Tait  (1984) 271 EG 105. 
26 See n 24, supra.  
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department, or the Attorney-General, for the negligent draftsmanship of the 
legislation. Because the legislation was primary legislation, he was discouraged from 
doing so by the Bill of Rights 1688 and by decisions such as Manuel v Attorney-
General [1988] 2 Ch 77 (a case concerning the Canada Act 1982 and the Statute of 
Westminster 1931).27   
 
Questions Facing the Common Law 
 
The drafting ambiguity in the Rent Act 1977, which led to the conflicting decisions 
discussed above, gives rise to three cardinal questions: 
 
1.  Would it have made any difference if the defective provisions in the Rent 
Act 1977 had not been incorporated in an Act of Parliament, but in one of the 
3,000 or so statutory instruments which are enacted under delegated powers in 
the UK every year? It is submitted that if government departments seek to 
avoid Parliamentary scrutiny (and the opportunity for legislative amendments) 
by using delegated legislation as a form of law making, those departments 
should not be allowed to hide behind the pretence that these statutory 
instruments are 'proceedings in Parliament'.  In sum, the Bill of Rights 1688 
ought not to prevent the government from being sued for legislative 
negligence in regard to statutory instruments. 
 
2.  Does the Human Rights Act 1998 preclude public authorities from 
claiming a blanket immunity from being sued by injured parties?  It is 
significant that the blanket immunity from actions in negligence given to the 
police by the Court of Appeal in Osman v Ferguson28 was held to be contrary 
to the European Convention on Human Rights in Osman v UK. 29  It is clear 
that the rejection by the European Court of Human Rights, in such cases as Z v 
U.K.30, of the U.S. doctrine of ‘substantive due process’ will not put an end to 
disputes about whether immunities from actions in negligence are substantive 
                                                 
27 Private information from Mr George Bednar (the resident landlord) who had taken leading counsel’s 
opinion. 
28 [1993] 4 All ER 344. 
29 (2000) 29 EHRR 245.  
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in nature or merely procedural devices to protect privileged parties.31   In any 
event, even substantive immunities can find themselves out of kilter with the 
times.32  Arguably, a prima facie case would arise if a loss of property rights 
(in breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention), or a 
breach of family and private rights (Article 8), were directly attributable to 
legislative negligence, as in Baran and Bednar v Magas.33  
 
3.  Do common law jurisdictions have anything to learn from the approach of 
the European Community to negligent drafting of EU regulations or 
directives? 
 
The European Dimension 
 
Regulatory law in the UK is increasingly being shaped from a European perspective.  
Such law does not fit comfortably with common law traditions and can be slow to 
respond to fresh demands.34 There is also a tradition of mythologizing about the 
common law.35 European law has been widely criticised for being obscure, complex 
and inaccessible.36 Accusations abound that the statutory law of the EC has become 
so burdensome and inflexible that it is damaging business, the economy and the 
                                                                                                                                            
30 [2001] 34 EHRR 97. 
31 Matthews v Ministry of Defence [2003] ICR 247. 
32 Hall v Simmons [2000] 3 WLR 543 (immunity of advocates);  Meadows v General Medical Council 
[2007] 1 All ER 1(immunity of expert witnesses from professional disciplinary proceedings).  See 
also: R. English, 'Forensic Immunity Post-Osman', 64 MLR 300, an analysis which has not been  
outdated by the subsequent decision of the ECtHR in Z v U.K. 
33 See n 24, supra. 
34 See: J. Steele, ‘Remedies and Remediation: Foundational Issues in Environmental Liability’ (1995) 
58 MLR 615; B. Pontin, ‘Tort Law and Victorian Government Growth: The Historiographical 
Significance of Tort in the Shadow of Chemical Pollution and Factory Safety Regulation’ (1998) 18 
OJLS 661; J. Murphy, ‘Noxious Emissions and Common Law Liability: Tort in the Shadow of 
Regulation’, pp 52-76, in: J. Lowry and R. Edmunds, Environmental Protection and the Common Law, 
(Oxford: Hart, 2000); S. Coyle and K. Morrow, The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law: 
Property Rights and Nature (Oxford: Hart, 2004); R. Malcolm and J. Pointing, ‘Statutory Nuisance: 
The Sanitary Paradigm and Judicial Conservatism’ (2006) 18 JEL 37. 
35 For example, Sir Leon Radzinowicz in his Seldon Society lecture on the life of Sir James Stephen 
opined: ‘The common law of this country, like the forces of growth which determine it, is sui generis; 
it constitutes an integral part of the national heritage and discharges a political, social and moral 
function which is much more precious than the shapely codes which the seekers after a legal paradise 
aspired to create’ [‘The Law Commission: Codification of the Criminal Law, a Report to the Law 
Commission’ 143 Law Com (1985) at para. 6]. 
36  Making the Law: The Report of the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process 
(London: The Hansard Society, 1992).  
 11 
prospects of European citizens.37 The production and accumulation of law in the EU 
has been truly staggering. Issues of relevance, accuracy, context, legitimacy, 
transparency all conspire to affect the law and its subsequent application. The quality 
of drafting raises major concerns, whether these arise from typographical errors, 
omissions, ambiguities, obsolescence, negligence or insufficient consultation. The 
problems which the EU faces are, therefore, exactly the same as those faced in other 
jurisdictions, possibly more so, given that much of the legislation is concerned with 
technical standards and a requirement to transpose policy into 21 languages.  
 
These problems are compounded by the legislative process. Briefly, drafting is in the 
hands of the Directorate General of the Commission, who is mainly concerned with 
the subject matter. The draftsman will usually be an expert in the field, but not 
necessarily a lawyer. The initial draft has to be passed on to the Commission’s Legal 
Service. This process looks to the legal basis of the Treaty and is not primarily 
concerned with the precise details of the text. The draft then goes to the Commission 
for approval, and, if approved, is then translated.38  Errors may be identified through 
this process, but due to translation problems some will be perpetuated or not identified 
at all. These processes take place before political ‘horse-trading’ within the Council 
starts. By this stage, political considerations, including the need for compromise and 
urgency, may prevail over the aim of producing legislation free from errors, omissions 
and ambiguities. In reality, much legislation and quasi-legislation is not given this 
level of scrutiny, particularly in highly technical areas of regulatory law. 
 
The problems with law-making in the EC have not gone unrecognised. Five initiatives 
have sought to reform the law:  the Sutherland Report39, the Brussels Programme40, 
the Molitor Report41, the SLIM project42 (Simpler Legislation for the Internal 
                                                 
37 T. Burns, ‘Better Lawmaking? An evaluation of lawmaking in the European Community’, in: P. 
Craig & C. Harlow (eds), Lawmaking in the European Union  (London: Kluwer Law International, 
1998).   
38 Problems derived from translation into the languages of the Member States, represents a huge 
problem and one that is set to increase, given the recent enlargement of the EU.  
39 The Internal Market After 1992: Meeting the Challenge. Report presented to the Commission by the 
High Level Group on the Functioning of the Internal Market (The Sutherland Report), EC COM 
(1992). 
40 The Brussels Programme, COM (93) 545.  
41 The Molitor Report, The Report of the Group of Independent Experts on Legislative and 
Administrative Simplification, COM SEC (95) 1379. 
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Market), and more recently the Better Regulation initiative.43  However, the wider 
problem of individuals sustaining harm from poorly-drafted legislation has not been 
addressed directly until now. 
 
EU Member State Liability  
 
Member State Liability is concerned with entitlements to damages for individuals 
who have suffered losses caused by breaches of EC law by Member States.  
Academics have written about this extensively, particularly since Francovich was 
decided by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1991.44  In Francovich45, the 
Court found that the State could be found liable in damages subject to the following 
conditions. Firstly, an applicant would need to show that the right being relied upon 
was one which could be identified from a Community measure. Secondly, he would 
need to show that a causal link existed between the State’s breach of its obligation and 
the harm suffered. This even extended to measures that were not directly effective. 
 
This principle was subsequently followed and developed in the Factortame and 
Brasserie46 litigation, and now extends not only to the non-implementation of 
directives, but also where the implementation of legislation is found to be ineffectual 
and or insufficient.47  Today, the opportunity to recover damages exists where a 
Member State has breached community law,  provided that: (1) the rule of law 
infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals; (2) the breach is sufficiently 
serious; and (3) there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage 
suffered. Recent case law has been preoccupied with defining the parameters of a 
                                                                                                                                            
42  Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market. Accessed via: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/simplification/index_en.htm     
 (last visited 25 October 2006).  
43 Better Regulation – Simplification Initiative. Accessed via : 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/regulation/better_regulation/simplification.htm 
(last visited 25 October 2006).  
44 For further detail see T Tridimas, ‘Liability for Breach of Community Law: Growing Up and 
Mellowing Down?’ (2001) 38 CMLRev 301; G. Anagnostaras, ‘The Allocation of Responsibility in 
State Liability Actions for Breach of Community Law’ (2001) 26 EL Rev 139; P. Craig, ‘Once More 
unto the Breach: The Community, the State and Damages Liability’ (2001) 106 LQR 67.  
45 Case C-6, C-9/90, Francovich and Boniface v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357.  
46 Case C-46/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany and Case C 48/93, R v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factotame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029.   
47 Case C-140/97, Rechberger v Austria [1999] ECR I-3499. 
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'sufficiently serious' breach.48  The point to be emphasised is that Member States can 
be held tortiously liable where the relevant domestic policy body fails to initiate the 
requisite legislation, or where the draftsman fails to articulate the intention of EC 
secondary legislation properly.  
 
Even though the parameters for awarding compensation are restrictive, State Liability 
extends nowadays to compensate for errors that originate from the drafting process. 
The obligation to transpose EC Law into State law is manifest in international law and 
is a recognised principle derived from the case law of the ECJ. In this context, 
liability stems from the actions of the legislature or the failure of the political system 
to initiate legislation. The well-documented development of State Liability challenges 
arguments that are hostile to the introduction of liability for negligent drafting in a 
domestic setting, where this results in ineffectual implementation.  If State Liability 
applies where a Member State has reneged on a commitment to implement legislation, 
either on time or in the correct form, is there a sound argument for denying the 
extension of liability to legislation that has been drafted in a truly negligent way? 
 
Critics of the introduction of such a concept may resort to a variant of the ‘floodgates’ 
argument. If an argument against introducing an action in legislative negligence is 
that it would  bring a flood of litigants to the doors of the Court, then one need only 
draw a parallel with the number of successful cases brought in respect of State 
Liability.  Here, the numbers are very low. Why, then, argue for a concept that is 
unlikely to be successful in any but the most persistent and disadvantaged cases? Part 
of the answer is that the threat of use is likely to be more effective than actual use. 
State Liability was developed as a result of a failure by Member States to complete 
the Single Market agenda and one reason given by the ECJ for its development was 
that the prospect of imposing liability resulting in damages would encourage Member 
States to fulfil their commitments.  On the other hand, the introduction of a new tort 
for grounding a claim of legislative negligence would provide legislators with a 
powerful incentive to ensure that legislation is soundly based and correctly 
formulated.  A potential liability in damages would help to tighten up the drafting 
                                                 
48 Case C-46/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany [1996] ECR I-1029, at para 56 'the clarity and 
precision of the EC rule breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or 
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process and improve the quality of legislation.   
Using State Liability as a template, it is unlikely that the introduction of liability for 
negligent drafting in  England and Wales (or in other EU Member States) would result 
in a flood of litigation, inhibit the drafting of legislation, or cause compensation to be 
awarded in any but the most deserving of cases. The contemporary system of State 
Liability is by no means perfect, but it signposts a concept that is already operational 
in the legal systems of all 27 Member States. These conditions, the authors argue, 
preclude any constitutional argument that might be used to resist the development of 
such a principle within a national legal system. 
 
Non-Contractual Liability and the Institutions of the European Union 
 
Having analysed State Liability, it is pertinent to take the European case a step further 
and to examine the extent to which the EU institutions can be held liable for 
negligence.  Community non-contractual liability is governed by Articles 23549 and 
28850.  These Articles are Delphic and vague.  In principle, the Community is liable 
for any damage which it causes, whether by its institutions51 or by its employees.52  
Article 288(2) requires Community courts to determine liability 'in accordance with 
the general principles of the Member States'.53 The prevailing academic opinion is 
that the intention of the treaty drafters was to empower the ECJ to 'develop a 
European standard of liability through the concretisation (sic) of general legal 
principles'.54  The articulation and development of principles suitable for achieving 
                                                                                                                                            
Community authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or voluntary, 
whether the error of law was excusable or non- excusable'. 
49 Article 235 EC Treaty; the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in disputes relating to 
compensation for damage provided for in the second paragraph of Article 288. 
50 Article 288(2) EC Treaty.  In the case of non-contractual liability, the community shall, in 
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member states, make good any 
damage caused by its institutions or by its servants or agents in the performance of their duties.  
51 This is seen to be a derivation from the French (a faute de service).  This terminology is used by the 
ECJ.  
52 a faute personelle.  
53 It is pertinent to note that if a number of Member States were to expand liability for negligent 
drafting, this may well compel the ECJ to build on its existing narrow principles.   
54 E. Grabitz, ‘Liability for Legislative Acts’ in H. Schermers & P. Mead (eds), Non-Contractual 
Liability of the European Communities (London: TMC Asser, 1988).  
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these ends appear to have been intentionally left ambiguous.55 Consequently, these 
principles reflect the teleological and constructivist approaches of the ECJ.   
 
On a first reading of Article 288, it would appear possible to use it to hold the 
institutions liable for poor drafting.  Furthermore, the limits to non-contractual 
liability are generous56; and applicants have a five-year limitation period running 
from the date when all the requirements for liability have materialised. Additionally, 
Article 288 does not maintain the strict locus standi requirements found in the 
Community’s review procedures.57  However, Article 288 has proved to be a cause of 
action having a very low success rate and the ECJ has all too often stopped short of 
awarding damages, even in instances where it has given a favourable judgment. 
 
The elements of liability under Article 288 are similar to those applicable to domestic 
English tort law. There must be: (1) a wrongful act or omission attributable to the 
Community; (2) damage to the claimant; and (3) a causal link between these two. 
Fault, as a concept, has rarely been debated, yet it is implicit that there must be some 
sort of fault for the Community to be liable under Article 288. The wrongful act must 
also be attributable to the EU. Its parameters are very wide and can be conceptualised 
under three headings: (1) negligent acts (by servants of the Community in the pursuit 
of their duties); (2) the adoption of wrongful legislative acts; (3) a failure of 
administration. The following analysis will focus on the last two of these.  
 
It has been argued that when Article 288 came into effect it was unclear whether the 
compensation provision was to be used as a sanction against non-compliant 
institutions, or whether it was intended to resolve grievances between the institutions 
and individuals.58  This ambiguity pervades the two routes by which it is possible to 
challenge poorly-drafted legislation. The first of these comprise challenges that result 
from the effects of the legislation. Secondly, it may be possible to challenge the 
                                                 
55 See Cases 5, 7 13-24/66 Kampffmeyer v Commission  [1967] ECR 317. 
56 S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (London: Longman, 2002), p388.  
57 Article 230 EC Treaty (Judicial Review), on standing for non-privileged applicants, is governed by  
Part 4:  ' Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a 
decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a 
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former'.  
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institutions by focusing on administrative acts: on the behaviour that preceded the 
legislation. As is highlighted in the following discussion, with both of these there are 
similarities in the requirements needed to establish a successful claim.  
 
Legislative Acts 
 
Where a legislative act does not entail any meaningful discretionary choice then it 
will normally suffice to show the existence of illegality, causation and damage.59 
Craig60 notes that 'it is possible to list a variety of errors which might lead to 
liability'.61 Given the predominately economic background to the Union in its early 
years, it is no surprise that much of the early case law on the legislative aspect of 
Article 288 deals with parts of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Where 
legislative action involves economic policy measures, it has been held that the 
Community does not incur non-contractual liability for damage suffered by 
individuals as a consequence of that action, unless a sufficiently flagrant violation of a 
superior rule of law for the protection of the individual has occurred. These conditions 
have come to be known as the Schoppenstedt criteria.62  
 
The distinction between legislative measures which involve economic policy 
considerations and those which do not has recently become blurred. It now appears 
that any general measure, any measure involving economic choices, and any measure 
involving discretionary choices will attract the strict Schoppenstedt conditions.63  The 
ECJ has used these conditions in determining most cases, particularly those 
                                                                                                                                            
58 J. Wakefield, ‘What is the Nature of the Non-Contractual Liability Claim?’ in J. Wakefield (ed), 
Judicial Protection Through the Use of Article 288(2) (London: Kluwer Law International, 2002).  
59 Cases 44-51/77, Union Malt v Commission [1978] ECR 57; Case T-481and 484/93, Vereniging van 
Exporteurs in Levende Varkens v Commission (Live Pigs) [1995] ECR II- 2941; Case 26/81, Oleifice 
Mediterranei v EEC [1982] ECR 3057,para 16; Case C-146/91, KYDEP v Council and Commission 
[1994] ECR I-4199; Cases C-258 and 259/90, Pesquerias de Bermo SA and Naviera Laida SA v 
Commission [1992] ECRI-2901; Case T-175/94, International Procurement Services v Commission 
[1996] ECR II-729,para 44; Case T-178/98, Fresh Marine Company SA v Commission para 3; Cases T-
79/96, 260/97, 117/98, Camar Srl and Tico Srl v Commission [2000] ECR II-2193,paras 204-5.  
60 P. Craig and G. De Burca, EU Law Text Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford  University 
Publishing, 3rd ed, 2002), p558.    
61 Examples include: the failure to gather the facts before reaching a decision, taking a decision based 
on irrelevant factors, failing to accord appropriate procedural rights to certain individuals before 
making a decision.  
62 Case 5/71, Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt v Council, [1971] ECR 975 at 984 para 11.   
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considered to be sufficiently serious.64 The burden of proof rests firmly on the 
applicant. The key criterion has been whether the breach was manifest and grave.65 
The case law indicates that there has been some assimilation of the term 'sufficiently 
serious' with the jurisprudence on State Liability.66  Therefore, where a Community 
institution has only a limited discretion in legislative matters, the mere infringement 
of a right might amount to a sufficiently serious breach.67 
 
In principle, it should be easier for individuals in the future to recover compensation 
where the legislative act in question does not involve a wide discretion.68  However, 
in areas where there are discretionary choices to be made, the hard task of proving the 
Schoppenstedt criteria still remains. There are few instances of successful challenges 
being made. In the Dumortier case the Court found that the Council had infringed the 
principle of equality, specifically: 'the Council was guilty of a grave and manifest 
disregard of the limits on the exercise of its discretionary powers in matters of the 
CAP'. 69 
 
The Court has also awarded damages in situations where import provisions had 
violated the principle of legitimate expectation.70  The parameters are by no means 
fixed and how far the ECJ will move in the future is a matter for speculation. With 
respect to liability for errors in drafting legislation, unless these involve matters where 
                                                                                                                                            
63 1) there must be a breach of a superior rule of law, 2) the breach must be sufficiently serious, 3) the 
superior rule of law must be one for the protection of the individual.  
64 See Case 74/74, Comptoir National Technique Agricole ( CNTA) SA v Commission [1975] ECR 
533; Case 83, 94/76, 4,15, 40/77, Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH & Co KG v Council 
and Commission [1978] ECR 1209; Case 116 and 124/77, Amylum NV and Tunnel Refineries Ltd. v 
Council and Commission [1979] ECR 3497; Case C-352/98, Laboratories Pharmaceutiques 
Bergaderm SA and Goupil v Commission ECR I-5291.  
65 Superior rules of law have included: principle of protection of legitimate expectation, the principle 
of proportionality, principle of equal treatment (equality or prohibition of discrimination), principle of 
care, principle of proper administration, prohibition of the misuse of powers, right to property, right to 
be heard, freedom to pursue an economic activity.  
66 Crucially, the relative clarity of the rule which has been breached, the measure of discretion left to 
the authorities, whether the error of law was excusable or not and whether the breach was intentional or 
voluntary. 
67 M.H. Van Der Woude, ‘Liability for Administrative Acts’ in  T. Heukels, and  A. McDonnell (eds), 
The Action for Damages in Community Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997). 
68 S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (London: Longman, 2002), p399.   
69 Joined Cases 64 and 113/76, 167 and 239/78, 28 and 45/79, Dumortier Frere v Council  [1979] 
ECR 1795.  
70 Case C-152/88, Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477 and Case 120/86, Mulder v Minister 
van Landbouw en Visserij (Mulder) [1988] ECR 2321.  
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discretion is minimal and economic policy matters are not involved, the stricter 
Schoppenstedt criteria will prevail.71  Only where a serious drafting error has 
occurred could it be envisaged that institutions will be held accountable. The 
conclusion to be drawn is that although compensation remains a possibility, the 
parameters are very narrow for establishing a successful action. 
 
Administrative Acts  
 
Administrative acts have been defined as: 'acts by which the administration applies 
general rules in individual case(s) or otherwise exercises its executive power in an 
individual manner'.72  As many administrative measures involve discretionary 
choices, which are just as difficult to determine as those made in the context of 
legislation, the Schoppenstedt test will again have to be applied. Again, the 
Community should be held liable within Article 288(2) where there is damage, proof 
of a causal link between the damage claimed and the conduct, and the conduct 
constitutes illegality.73  
 
This legal test has led to liability of the EC on only a handful of occasions.74  Van der 
Woude maintains that this is due to the regulatory nature of activities of the EC 
institutions, yet he foresees a general rise in the number of future claims.75 In line 
with the general theme of this paper, the failure to exercise supervisory powers 
properly may give rise to liability for poorly or negligently drafted legislation. This 
principle can also be applied to the delegation of legislative powers. Where a 
Community institution delegates governmental powers to some other body, the acts of 
                                                 
71 C. Hilson, ‘The Role of Discretion in EC Law on Non-Contractual Liability’ (2005) 42 CML Rev 
677.   
72 E. Grabitz, ‘Liability for Legislative Acts’ in H. Schermers and P. Mead (eds), Non-Contractual 
Liability of the European Communities (London: TMC Asser, 1988). 
73 Various shortcomings in the performance of administrative acts have been held to constitute fault 
which may cause the Community to incur liability, including: lack of care in implementing powers, 
misuse of powers, failure to adopt a required act, defective systems adopted by an authority which can 
be attributed to the Community, lack of supervision, failure to rectify information in time once it 
becomes clear that the information provided was incorrect, failure to comply with internal rules and a 
breach of duty of confidentiality, failure to supervise subordinate officials or outside bodies to whom 
functions have been delegated, giving misleading information to the public, delay, lack of foresight. 
74 Cf. Case 145/83, Adams v Commission, [1985] ECR and  Case T-514/93, Cobrecaf v Commission, 
[1995] ECR II-624. 
75 M.H. Van Der Woude, ‘Liability for Administrative Acts’ in T. Heukels and  A. McDonnell (eds), 
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that body in the exercise of those powers may be imputed to the Community, and so 
the Community will become vicariously responsible.76  Additionally, within the 
grounds that could constitute illegality - lack of foresight, delay and negligence in 
implementing powers - all of these stand as potential grounds for challenging poor 
drafting.77 
 
Deviation from an ideal standard of service will not usually constitute fault. Non-
contractual liability carries with it a connotation of blameworthiness. Whilst a breach 
of this duty could constitute fault and hence illegality, there is a firm indication that 
Community institutions operate under what amounts to a 'presumption of good 
faith'.78  To establish a claim, an applicant has to rebut this presumption. The Fresh 
Marine79 case articulates this principle, albeit somewhat inelegantly: 
 
in instances where there is an administrative measure, not involving economic 
policy choices and it confers only very little or no discretion, the finding of an 
error which, in analogous circumstances, an administrative authority, 
exercising ordinary care and diligence, would not have committed, this will 
support the conclusion that the conduct of the Community institution was 
unlawful in such a way as to render the Community liable under Article 288 
EC.  
 
To rebut the presumption of good faith, therefore, requires proof that a Community 
institution acted without 'ordinary care or diligence'. Where discretion is an issue, or 
where economic policy applies, then the rigid Schoppenstedt criteria will have to be 
applied.  The result is that a claim for poor or negligent drafting will be much harder 
to establish. It is, however, the contention of the authors that were a piece of 
legislation to be so badly drafted, one of the above routes could (and should) yield 
some form of compensation.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
The Action for Damages in Community Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p126.    
76 Case 32-3/58, SNUPAT v High Authority, [1959] ECR 127.  
77 T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th 
ed, 2003), p460. 
78 J.A. Usher, General Principles of EC Law (London: Longman, 1998), p120.    
79 Case T-178/98, Fresh Marine [2000] ECR II-3331. 
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The critical stumbling block is the level of proof required to sustain such an action. 
Whilst 'transparency' in the Community institutions is now a by-word, trying to 
ascertain the requisite evidence in the past would have been far too onerous. The ECJ 
has recognised on a number of occasions that standards of good administration had 
not been observed, but has gone on to express nothing more than judicial regret.80  
This parallels the Article 230 situation: a breach of the principle will only be 
successful to ground an action for annulment if it can be shown that the act at issue 
would have been different in the absence of the irregularity and the applicant had an 
interest in taking the point.  
 
The difficulty of recovering compensation from the Community for losses caused by 
legislative measures has often been noted.81  The Court has given two reasons for 
adopting a strict approach.  The first, cited in the HNL82 case, where the ECJ 
indicated that its view was: 
 
explained by the consideration that the legislative authority, even where the 
validity of its measures is subject to judicial review, cannot always be 
hindered in making its decisions by the prospect of applications for damages 
whenever it has occasion to adopt legislative measures in the public interest 
which may adversely affect the interest of individuals.  
 
Secondly, there is the argument that it would not be in the Community’s interests for 
its potential liability in damages to be too wide should a mistake be made, due to the 
effects on the Community purse and on future legislative decision-making.  
 
These two reasons explain the reluctance of the ECJ to expand the principle of 
culpability. As mentioned previously with respect to State Liability, there is the 
familiar ‘floodgates’ argument, applied to cover not only the number of claimants 
who may arrive at the door of the Court but also the size of payouts. Generally, those 
in control of any political and legal system would wish to limit the scope of its 
                                                 
80  See Usher, n 78, supra.   
81 A. Arnull, ‘Liability for Legislative Acts Under Article 215(2)EC’ in T. Heukels and  A. McDonnell 
(eds), The Action for Damages in Community Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 2001). 
82 Case C-390/95, P. Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I-769. 
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liability to a minimum. However, the EU is different in that it has departed from the 
orthodox position of immunity from suit, and with Article 288 it has developed 
liability for some of its actions, notably where gross negligence can be shown. 
 
A number of other arguments can be made to explain the limited use and development 
of the concept.  These include: the problems of balancing the public interest with 
private interests; the limited amount of legislation drafted by the EC that does not 
subsequently need to be validated by a domestic legislature; the general reluctance on 
the part of litigants to claim compensation for drafting errors; and, finally, regret on 
the part of the EC that this concept was ever introduced into the Treaty framework.  
The authors of this paper believe that such arguments excluding liability for drafting 
errors are not persuasive. Were the Community to protect itself from the 
consequences of negligent drafting of legislation too comprehensively, then there 
would come a point when such immunity becomes oppressive, denies individual 
rights, and over-protects institutions from legal challenge.  
 
Conclusions 
 
It has been shown in this article that European Union law requires Member States to 
provide limited  remedies to citizens who have suffered from the consequences of 
negligently drafted legislation.  The European Union is in a position where it has an 
elementary form of non-contractual liability for poorly drafted or non-existent 
legislation in the form of State Liability or under Article 288(2). On first reading, 
Article 288(2) appears to be a panacea for all the ills of legislative drafting. Whilst the 
EU has been assertive enough to engage directly with the concept of non-contractual 
liability, case law indicates that the floodgates have remained tightly shut. It is, and 
always has been, open to the courts to construe ‘illegality’ narrowly, or to define it so 
as to preclude liability unless there has been some serious error.  
 
In this paper the authors argue that it cannot be right for individuals to have no redress 
for the harm inflicted by legislative negligence.  The absence of suitable  remedies 
calls into question the legitimacy of a legislative system. In the case of domestic 
legislation citizens are more at the mercy of their legislators.  The Law Commission 
has played an important role in developing new legislation and in promoting change 
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in a common law system reliant on incremental rather than on more dramatic change.  
Even so, this body has not been able to curb the government’s enthusiasm for change 
as exemplified by the reckless drafting of the ‘bad character’ provisions of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003.83  The scrutiny powers of the House of Lords as a 
legislative body go some way towards reducing the scope of governments to get 
things wrong, but do not remove the potential for legislative negligence.  
 
The argument in favour of a tort of negligent legislative drafting becomes ever more 
compelling when fundamental issues going beyond pure economic loss are at stake, 
such as public health, food safety or property rights. On the other hand, effective  
immunity from actions in negligence would be contrary to entrenched human rights 
(such as those found in the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols). 
In answer to the question: is there anything that can be learnt from the EU? it is the 
authors’ contention that the answer is 'yes'.  It is possible to establish a system of non-
contractual liability which, in exceptional circumstances, has compensated an 
individual for the misdemeanours of Member States either through Member State 
Liability or the acts of Community institutions under Article 288(2). With the former, 
compensation becomes payable where there has been a failure to legislate or where 
legislation has been ineffective. In theory, Article 288(2) is broad enough to 
encompass the principle of culpability for negligent drafting.   
 
As to how an action based on legislative negligence might be brought presently in the 
English and Welsh courts it is difficult to see how this could be grounded without 
constitutionally entrenched rights.  Fundamental rights in the UK are protected under 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  The relatively wide availability of 
judicial review provides important but limited forms of protection for individuals in 
respect of the administrative functions of public authorities. Uniquely, the Human 
Rights Act 1998 does give the High Court the right to test legislation against the basic 
tenets of the European Convention.84  But there is no equivalent in England and 
Wales to the powers of the German Constitutional Court to declare an act of the State 
(or that of an individual) to be in breach of the Basic Law, or any powers like those of 
                                                 
83 See Rose LJ’s comments in R v Bradley, n 23, supra. 
84 Section 4 of the Act provides the higher courts with the power to make a declaration of 
incompatibility with the rights enshrined in the European Convention. 
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the United States Supreme Court to find legislative acts to be in breach of 
constitutional rights.85  The complexity of this approach further supports the need for 
entrenched constitutional rights to challenge any legislation that is drafted negligently. 
 
Whilst reform of the judicial functions of the House of Lords is looking to remain on 
the political agenda, perhaps the time is now ripe for developing a new tort regarding 
harm that results from negligent legislation.  This could proceed alongside rights 
becoming enshrined in a form of basic law, because it would be over these rights that 
the new Supreme Court would exercise its jurisdiction. Development of such rights 
would leave judges significant scope to perform the balancing function which 
common law judges are traditionally adept at. The right which the authors see as 
needing to be protected by constitutional provisions (including the Human Rights Act 
1998) would be broad.   This would be the right to have legislation enacted that is not 
drafted in a way that is so negligent that it causes loss or harm to the claimant.  It is 
accepted that this states a principle very broadly and that areas of harm will need to be 
particularised or limited to particular spheres, such as personal liberty, property rights, 
freedom of expression or public health. Ultimately, these are issues for the people to 
decide.  
 
 
                                                 
85 For a discussion of the superiority of German law with regard to rights of privacy and the concept of 
a constitutional tort in German law, see: B. Markesinis, ‘Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the 
Horizontal Effects of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany’ (1999) 115 LQR 47-88. 
